

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE WITH COLONEL DONALD J. BACON, CHIEF OF STRATEGY AND PLANS, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ, VIA TELECONFERENCE FROM IRAQ DATE: WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007

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COL. BACON: (In progress from source) -- projected a time as I go through. And I've not done a phone blog-in like this. I do a lot of call-ins with radio. But please interject if I'm not making anything clear.

And hopefully, if you saw some of the attachments that were sent out, we did put out the September al Qaeda rollup and did that in a press release today, and I think that was sent out to you yesterday. Do you have that?

CHARLES "JACK" HOLT (chief, New Media Operations, OASD PA): Yes, sir, we do.

You guys online, you received that this morning, correct?

Q Yes. Q Yes, sir.

COL. BACON: What I was hoping to do is just give a little background on that and then talk about one in particular, Muthanna. And then I'll also tell you more about the Qods Force operative and what we released today on that.

But with this September rollup, there was 29 senior-level al Qaeda folks that were either captured or killed in the month of September, and I just want to hit some of the highlights on here. And if I start off on the very top on the left side and I'll sort of work my way around counterclockwise.

The first one I want to point out is Muhammad al Afari. He was the emir of Sinjar, which means he was in charge of that whole area where the city of Sinjar is out there, by the Syrian-Iraqi border. He was the one that oversaw the Yazidi bombings on 14 August that resulted in over 700 casualties. He was killed.

The ones in the red boxes show that they were killed.

Muthanna -- I'm going to come back to that one because that was a big focus at the press conference today, and we had not released his information before.

If you work your way farther down, you'll see a guy named Fallah Khalifah Haysi Fayyad Adhab, and he goes by Abu Khamis. He was the one who was

involved in the killing of Sheikh Sattar, so that was a big capture for us, and we have him in detention right now.

If you work farther -- two farther down, Salim Ismail Abdul Salih Ramadi, otherwise known Abu Bakr. He was a big guy that we've not talked a whole lot about, but he was the deputy emir of the northern belt. So if you look at all of the suburban areas up in the north and northwest, he was the number two in command. In fact, it's his brother who is the overall commander, and he goes by the name of Gazwan (ph). So he was a big capture, and we're hoping to exploit a lot of information available to further roll up those networks in the northern area there.

One farther down, Abu Taghrid. He was the emir of the Rusafa car bomb network, and he dates back -- going back to 2004 doing car-bombing operations in Baghdad. In fact, he had moved up to Tikrit about 14 months ago, and we were having so much success against those car-bomb networks here in Baghdad that about two months ago he was asked to move back to Baghdad and take that network back over, and he was killed this past month.

Probably the -- I would say the biggest operation or most significant one was Abu Usamah al-Tunisi, which we announced last week. He was the emir of the southern belt. He was also in charge of the foreign terrorist network. And so he had -- wore two hats there, and he was killed -- it was an F-16 targeting last week. He was Tunisian, so he wasn't only in charge of the foreign terrorist network, he was a foreign leader himself. He was assessed to be the likely successor to al-Masri if something happened to al-Masri, which we're trying hard to make that happen.

To continue working around, it's about your 4:00 position, Abu Yaqub al-Masri. He was another one of the senior inner-city -- or inner-circle guys with the overall leader. Him and Tunisi were both considered in the inner circle with two others with al-Masri. So what you see here is two of the four folks that we consider in the inner circle of the overall emir of al Qaeda were killed this past month.

If you go up one more, Abu Wathiq. He was the Tarmiyah al Qaeda leader. He was one of the original al Qaeda leaders in Iraq, back in 2003. He helped found al Qaeda in Tarmiyah. His nickname was "the executioner." He was known to execute people on the main intersection in Tarmiyah. So he was a very good capture for us, and a big part of hopefully our future success in Tarmiyah, where we've put a lot of emphasis this past month.

And then one other one I'd like to point out to you, at about the 1:00 or 2:00 there, Ali Fayyad Ubayd Ali. Ali Fayyad is -- he's the -- it says underneath it the "advisor to the senior leaders." He was one of the senior advisers in Mosul.

He helped orchestrate some jailbreaks for some of the al Qaeda terrorists up in that area -- very close to al-Masri. In fact, and this is what I want to make sure you know, he was the father-in-law to al-Masri, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, so very important capture there. And we're hoping to exploit that, get closer to the leader himself.

Q What was that name again?

COL. BACON: It was Ali Fayyad Ubayd Ali, the adviser to senior leaders. You'll see that as his title. He's the fourth one down on the right side.

Q Thank you.

COL. BACON: So that's just sort of the highlights of the rollup for September, to put September in perspective.

I'd like to go back to Muthanna. He's the third one down on the left-hand side. He was the emir on the Iraqi-Syrian border and he was responsible for working the foreign terrorist flow into Iraq, and not the entire border, but up in that region.

He was killed on 11 September, along with seven other al Qaeda terrorists. Two of them died when one of those guys did their suicide vest, and six others were killed in the gunfight -- no U.S. or coalition casualties in that. He has ties to the Syrian foreign terrorist facilitator, so he was working across the border to get these foreign terrorists across.

So just within their own right, that was a big operation, to interdict that part of the network. But once we were going through the area where he was at and exploiting it, we found some impressive things for us. We captured over 400 documents. We found three computer hard drives, two thumb drives and 11 CDs.

And from that, we got a list of over 500 foreign terrorists who were trying to get into Iraq, that al Qaeda was working to get into Iraq. And we also found 143 foreign terrorist biographies of who were actually en route or who had already entered Iraq. And on these bios, they had their personal data, pictures, who recruited them in their country of origin and their route of entry -- how did they get here? And we also saw, from that, a source of 13 countries where these foreign terrorists came from, out of the 143. We also found paperwork showing the routing and the financial transactions associated with each foreign terrorist out of that 143. We also found pledges from those foreign terrorists, who had pledged to do suicide operations, so we put that on the network. I think we sent that to you yesterday as well.

So it was a good find. We're exploiting it. And obviously we waited a few weeks so we could release it at our timing and when we felt ready to release it.

A little more background on the foreign terrorist flow -- typically we've been seeing between 60 and 80 foreign terrorists enter Iraq on average. Over 70 to 80 -- excuse me, 80 to 90 percent of your foreign terrorists, of your suicide bombings, are done by foreign terrorists. So it's important that we interdict this flow.

And we have seen a decrease in the last couple months, as noted by General Petraeus. We think that's a result of our interdiction efforts, one, like attacking this network here, also getting al- Tunisi, who is the overall-in-charge, doing those kind of operations. We're also seeing a more aggressive Iraqi security operation on the border and we're also seeing a good engagement by the Iraqis, as well as our government, working with the neighboring states, and they're taking more aggressive actions. So those three things combined are starting to have some impact on that foreign terrorist flow, which will in turn decrease the suicide bombing operations that we have here.

So we got to keep that pressure up and keep working at this problem because it's the key to reducing violence, particularly the high- profile attacks that we have here periodically.

The second thing I'd like to brief you on is the -- a little more information on the Qods Force operative that was detained on 20 September. As you know and has been previously reported, he was posing as a businessman. He was using the name Aga Farhadi (ph); in reality, his name was Mahouk Mahmudi Farhadi (ph), and his role in the Qods Force is as follows.

Big picture, first of all, the Ramazan Corps is the organization that does operations here in Iraq to -- they use it to -- they're the ones who transit in the weapons, the funding and help coordinate Iraqi militia extremists into Iran to get them training and then get them back into Iraq. So the Ramazan Corps is over all in charge of this, feeding the militia extremist network.

It's got three sub-commands, and one of those sub-commands is the Zafr Command. It's spelled Z-A-F-R. Well, Mahmudi Farhadi was the commander of the Zafr Command, one of three units of the Ramazan Corps, so he was a significant leader in this organization. The area of responsibility for the Zafr Command was in the north and central border area between Iraq and Iran, so it had that northern-central border area. We had multiple sources that show Farhadi in his identity and role. He was physically identified -- or, you know, positively identified. We also know that he has worked for Iranian intelligence for over 10 years working the Iraqi portfolio.

A little more background, the Zafr Command and the area that they oversee here in Iraq is an area where we have found a lot of explosively formed penetrators, and that's -- those come from Iran, and we've also had a lot of indirect fire attacks involving weapons that come from Iran -- they're missiles, in particular, and 240- millimeter rockets.

We'd also like to play out -- and this is what General Bergner said today. We would prefer not to be able to say this. We would like to see Iran live up to their commitments that they have stated publicly to provide a stable -- or to help seek a secure and stable Iraq. We'd like to see that excellence fulfilled, but we have not seen that. And we have an obligation through a U.N. mandate, as well as working with the Iraqis here, to deal with these security issues, and when we find a Qods Force operative that is instrumental to the shipment of these weapons and funding and training of these militia extremists, we have no choice but to fulfill our responsibilities.

So that's my opening comments, and I'm ready to discuss any of the above or if I'm able to anything else.

MR. HOLT: Okay, sir, thank you very much, Colonel Bacon, with us for the bloggers roundtable this morning. It sounds like we've got a few folks that have joined us here as he was giving his opening statement.

But let's start with Marvin Hutchens with ThreatsWatch.

Marvin?

Q Thank you, sir. Colonel, thanks for being here this morning.

COL. BACON: You're welcome.

Q In the slides that you sent to us, they included the 120-millimeter rounds with Iranian markings and things. Could you tell us a little bit about where those were found and with whom?

COL. BACON: Yes. We didn't actually put those in the press conference today, but we still sent those out to you because it's something that's not unusual. We're fighting these things all the time, and this find here wasn't all that big.

But there were mortars that were found in Baghdad on this last Sunday, and we know from our experts that they were of Iranian origin. You wouldn't think so because it has English markings on there, but that's the way they market them. And you can actually look at the Iranian website and actually look at the weapons that -- they've marked it on their website, and they have the same kinds of markings.

MR. HOLT: Okay.

Q Okay, sir.

COL. BACON: What else can I --

Q When you found them in Baghdad specifically, do you know what group was in possession of them?

COL. BACON: Well, they were -- we associated them -- and I didn't have an actual name of the group, but they were associated with the militia extremists.

Q Okay.

COL. BACON: So they were --

Q Shi'a --

COL. BACON: They're part of the special group or the rogue elements that we associate with the Shi'a militia extremists.

Q Great. Thank you, sir.

MR. HOLT: Okay. Bill Roggio.

COL. BACON: That's the things we look at. We look at the neighborhood they're found in, so that helps us. Like, for example, we've had -- a week or two weeks prior, we had a 240-millimeter attack. Currently we know that those 240 millimeters do come from Iran, but they were actually fired from an area that the extremist militias are operating in.

So, I mean that's a good question. I mean, looking at it from multiple angles, we came to this assessment.

MR. HOLT: All right, sir. Bill Roggio.

Q Colonel, I actually was at 3rd ID headquarters when that 240 mortar went off, or that rocket went off. At a thousand meters away, it was quite loud.

COL. BACON: I heard that people nearby thought it actually hit the building, it was so loud.

Q Oh, yeah. The windows shook. It was quite loud. I think it was one killed and 11 wounded. COL. BACON: Right.

Q Real quick, I want to follow up on Ali Fayyad Ubayd Ali. You said he was the brother-in-law or the father-in law of --

COL. BACON: Sir, he's the father-in-law. If I told you brother- in-law, my fault

Q Father-in-law. Okay. Real quick, can you name the two other commands within the Ramazan Corps?

COL. BACON: Well, I need to double-check if I can or not. What we did is we sought to get this information releasable, and that's what was released through my channel. So I'll ask the question.

Q Okay. And concerning the markings, again, on the mortars and rockets that are discovered, has Iran denied that these are Iranian weapons?

COL. BACON: They in general have denied it. Not maybe this specifically, but they have denied in the past that they're doing these things.

Q They've denied --

COL. BACON: In fact, they pledged to help build the security at the same time.

I'm sorry, go ahead.

Q Okay, that's fine. I mean, when you present them with evidence that, you know, hey, these are actually Iranian weapons, do they say that these are not Iranian weapons?

COL. BACON: I've heard them deny that they're doing it. I also have heard -- and I would need to double-check to make sure it came through official channels that they said this -- that maybe through black market channels from Iran. I've heard that bandied about before. But more often than not, they deny any official involvement in this. But we know that they do have official involvement and those denials aren't true.

I mean, we have not only the weapons -- and you could see if we only had the weapons alone, well, maybe through some kind of black market means from Iran to here, you could maybe sketch it out. But when you actually have captured Qods Force operatives and leaders in country and you know that they're involved in it; when you actually have someone like Ali Mussa Daqduq, who is a Lebanese Hezbollah senior leader sent here from Iran into Iraq to monitor the training that the Iraqis were getting in Iran, to see how they can improve that training; when you have the leader of the special groups, Qais Khazali, who says he's traveled to Iran multiple times, received so much money every month from the Iranian Qods Force, there is no doubt that there's official involvement, is my point. Q And real quick, one question. Has the operations -- (inaudible) -- set up the checkpoints? I was just down there with the Georgians. Has that yielded any results?

COL. BACON: I haven't seen anything official yet. I'll keep my eyes open on it. Or I've not seen any reporting on that yet. I know that they were set up down there to help with those efforts, and that's as much as i know right now.

Q Thank you, sir.

COL. BACON: You probably have more up-to-date info on there if you were down there.

Q Yeah, okay.

MR. HOLT: Bruce McQuain.

Q Yes, sir, Colonel. One clarification. When you were going through the list there, you talked about Abu Taghrid, who had the --

COL. BACON: Yes.

Q -- and you said he was killed; the slide shows he was captured. Could you clarify that?

COL. BACON: No, he was killed. Abu Taghrid -- and he should have a red box around --

MR. HOLT: No, it has a brown box around it.

COL. BACON: Oh, it must -- you know what it is? Look to the right versus below it.

Q To the right -- yeah --

COL. BACON: Yeah, if you look to the right --

Q Anyway --

COL. BACON: -- to the box of the profile -- he was killed.

Q He was killed? Okay, cool.

COL. BACON: Correct.

Q Also --

COL. BACON: Yeah, he -- we -- he was in a car with another -- I'd have to refresh my memory to the exact operation, but he was in a car with someone else, and we tried to stop him. He refused, showed hostile intent, and both him and the person he was driving with got killed.

Q Okay. One other question. You talked about seeing a decrease over the months of -- the flow of foreign terrorists, and you mentioned that one of the three things being done is more aggressive action by neighboring states. Could you address that specifically having to do with Saudi Arabia and Syria? COL. BACON: Well, I'll give you one example of Saudi Arabia, and there's -- and I'd have to think through this to remember, make sure I'm not providing information I shouldn't be providing yet, but I do know this much that I can

release, that they're doing a good job. When they capture foreign terrorists, they're showing on their TV and doing advertising of guys we've captured or folks who have recanted saying, "I shouldn't have been doing this."

I'll give you one example. There was a Saudi who was driving a suicide truck here in Iraq, and it detonated on him, and he didn't -- I don't know if he did it or sometimes they, you know, trip, and it detonated on him and they didn't know it was going to detonate, but it didn't kill him. And he got burns over a good chunk of his body, and, you know, he's very much scarred. So he got captured. We gave him medical care, and over time, he has been sent back to Saudi Arabia, where he is now fairly visible on TV talking about, hey, this is wrong, I made a mistake. And so they're using him to help deter others from making this choice. So that is one example that Saudi Arabia is doing. I think it's fairly effective. I've seen the actual shows that they've done on this, recanting foreign terrorists.

They're taking some other actions as well. I just -- I've read about it and seen that they have done some things, looking at the -- some of the money trails, trying to deter folks from making this decision. I think in an unofficial arena, we're seeing more and more Saudi imams talk against supporting the terrorists in Iraq. So there's multiple things going on there and some positive developments in Saudi Arabia.

Q Yeah. In fact, (Memory ?), who released a -- something yesterday saying that one of the muftis in Saudi Arabia spoke out against that.

COL. BACON: There's more and more religious leaders speaking up in Saudi Arabia, and that is a very promising development. And we need that, because that carries some credibility with the crowd that's being recruited.

Q A follow-up. Anything you can tell us about Syria's action?

COL. BACON: We -- I just don't -- Syria's security is more aggressive in finding the guys when they're entering Syria and before they leave Syria for Iraq. So the Syrian security forces are being more aggressive. And we're still seeing an inflow, but the flow is not as high as it was, and it's just a little too early yet to say, okay, this is continuing and significant, but initially, it appears to be a positive trend. And I'll just say that the Syrian security forces are being more aggressive.

Q Thank you. MR. HOLT: All right. We've had a few other folks online -- join us online.

Q Lieutenant Fishman's on.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Jarred, go ahead.

Q Thank you, sir, for your time.

COL. BACON: You're welcome.

Q Could you talk a little bit about how we actually conduct the operations? In other words, where do we get the intelligence from? And are we able to then build those institutions within the Iraqi forces so that once our troops begin to draw down, they will still have the ability to track the al Qaeda guys, fix them in place, and then have U.S. Air Force assets then destroy their hiding sites?



COL. BACON: Well we -- one thing I've seen here is our Special Ops forces do a lot of operations with the Iraqi special ops forces. We've been seeing -- (inaudible) -- that are the Special Ops folks working with the Iraqis. So there's some good training going on there, and I think -- and we also have the MNSTC-I command that works a lot with the Iraqis and providing this training and try to get their institutions in place that can do that.

Just so -- (inaudible), you're talking about how we get the intelligence. I can't go into a lot of specifics here other than I can say each operation normally gets you more information and you can feed off of that. So obviously this Muthanna -- finding him and his documents enables us to peel that onion, you know, a layer deeper.

Q Just a quick follow-up. Are you seeing any increased, you know, HUMINT from actual Iraqi citizens or Iraqi forces where they're pointing out the special group or the IRTC or the Qods Force guys in the Shi'a communities?

COL. BACON: We're seeing -- we're starting to see it in the Shi'a communities too. I would say that's a more recent development. We have seen a lot, obviously, and I'm sure you're all well abreast of the Sunni partnerships that we've been having, but we're starting to see more and more Shi'a neighborhoods, you know, starting to partner up, and it's a beginning trend. And so, yes, we've had folks point out weapons caches, point out folks who are not acting -- they they point out as being a malicious extremist, and so we're -- we're seeing the beginning trend of that, and that's promising. Obviously, we've got a lot more to do, and it's not -- it's not a hundred -- it's not totally spread across, so we've got to continue nurturing that trend and making those partnerships with the Shi'a community.

MR. HOLT: All right, does -- is anyone else online?

Q Hey, Andrew's on.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Andrew, go ahead.

Q Colonel, good afternoon. Andrew Lubin from U.S. Calvary ON Point.

Sir, when you grabbed the Iraqi businessman -- excuse me, the Iranian businessman/intelligence expert, Mr. Maliki came out right away and demanded his release. Are we looking -- is he doing this, do you think, mostly in response to the Blackwater situation, or are the ties between Iran and Iraq really that strong where Mr. Maliki wanted him out?

COL. BACON: Well, I think that was what he said initially. We have subsequently have done a lot of sharing with the Iraqi leadership and try to share with them what we know. And I think what you're seeing is less of those comments as of late.

Q Great. Thank you.

MR. HOLT: Okay, anyone else?

Q Yeah, Mike Goldfarb, Weekly Standard.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Mike, go ahead.

Q Colonel, I love this chart you guys have here, it's fantastic. But I'd just like to ask you, what would you -- what would your response sort of be to people who say, "Well, you know, you kill one of these guys, another guy pops up in his place"? You know, sort of, you know what's the overall effect on the organization of taking out these many people in a month? Are they replaced quickly, and are those replacements sort of as capable as the people you're taking out?

MR. HOLT: Well, where they can, they do do replacing. However, at the scope that we're doing it and if you hit -- and we've hit a lot of the replacees, over time you lose that experience. You get less qualified leaders in that spot. You start deterring folks.

I would tend to agree if there was like four or five each month. You could say, well, they could probably reconstitute. But at the level that we're hitting them at every month since the surge, it's hard to reconstitute these, especially with the quality of leaders and the right type of leaders that you want. So it is having an impact there.

But we have seen sort of -- obviously al-Masri replaced Zargawi, so they can do some replacements. But at the level that we're hitting them at, we're making it hard for them to do it. And fact is, they spend a lot of time working on their own security and self-preservation, and that's less time that they're working to do terrorism here in Iraq. So that's another side effect of these operations.

Q Thank you very much, sir.

COL. BACON: Hopefully I answered that well enough. They are having a hard time reconstituting at the level that we're working. They are putting people back in those spots, but they don't have the same experience, and in some areas we're seeing where the deterrence is working because -- at the level of success that we're having.

Q Well, thank you, sir.

MR. HOLT: All right. Any follow-up questions? We're just about out of time.

Q Yeah. Charlie Quidnuc at Whizbang.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Charlie.

Q Colonel, my question follows on to Andrew Lubin's about this -- are we getting resistance from Iraqi political leaders when you capture one of these Iraqi Qods Force. They claim he's a businessman or -- are we getting less pushback than we used to?

COL. BACON: I think, subsequent to the -- Farhadi's detention, where there was some comments obviously, I think we've had less after that initial detention. And I -- we respect Maliki and Talabani, and so we tried to hurry up and show them the background. And I think we've heard less of that since then, so I -- you know, but we have to realize, though, Iran is their neighbor, and so there are sensitivities. A lot of trade goes into the northern area of Kurdistan there, so there were some sensitivities there. And, however, if we

show that what this guy was in charge of -- and the fact is they're killing not only coalition forces, but Iraqis as well -- we think the message will win out.

Q And did they close the border between Iran and Iraq as a retaliation? Is that open now, or is it still closed?

COL. BACON: That's still closed. I think we saw some things going through, but still officially closed. I think they're allowing some stuff getting through. It was closed in the northern area, primarily, along Kurdistan.

And it's interesting, you know; they're saying they're doing that -- actually they denied today that they're doing that because of Farhadi, but initially they closed it because of Farhadi. And to close a whole border area for, quote, a "businessman" seems to belie that point, if you ask me. The fact that he was a senior leader in the Qods Force, and their response seems to be indicative of that.

MR. HOLT: All right.

Q One more question, Colonel.

COL. BACON: Okay.

Q Is he the most senior -- it's Bill Roggio -- is he the most senior Qods Force operative we've captured so far?

COL. BACON: You know, it's hard to compare that. I'd need to probably dig that a little closer, compare that with the Irbil five, and -- because we do have some other Qods Force operatives. I don't know how he ranks when you compare to the Irbil five. He is obviously very important, though, to that Ramazan (ph) corps, being one of the three subordinate commanders.

And to be candid with you, I'd need to look back at the Irbil five and do a comparison. But to my knowledge he is, but I'd have to double-check.

Q Okay. A while back it was reported that a gentleman named Khazali, I believe it was, was supposed to be the third in Qods Force, was captured. Can you confirm or deny that?

COL. BACON: I'm unaware of that.

Q Okay.

COL. BACON: Honestly, I don't know about that.

Q Okay. That was like -- it was like early spring or --

COL. BACON: I think I would have known that if it was here in Iraq. I'm unaware of that. I do know that the fact that we got Ali Mussa Daqduq, who was -- he was working for the Qods Force but a Lebanese Hezbollah, that was big news. And Qais Khazali, being the leader of the overall special groups working with the Qods Force, those were all huge operations or successful operations against the Qods Force.

Q Do you think that there's any value in making the distinction between Qods Force and special groups and guys like Daqduq? I mean, don't they really all fall under the command of Qods Force, just like someone like --

COL. BACON: Well, we try to be clear about it because if you say a Qods Force officer, he's actually Iranian. So Farhadi is an actual Iranian operative, whereas if I say special groups, in this case Khazali is Iraqi. Special groups are the actual Iraqi militant or a(n) organization within Iraq, and they're Iraqi -- trained, funded and supported by the Qods Force. So we try to be careful because we don't want to say Qais Khazali, for example, is a Qods Force officer because it would maybe imply that he's Iranian. So we're just trying to be as forthcoming and as clear as we can on that. And you know, let me know if we're not doing a good enough job on it, but that's our effort.

Q Well, but, I mean, isn't something like Imad Mukhnia (ph) considered a Qods Force officer, or -- I mean, he holds a rank in Qods Force, does he not, even though he's Lebanese birth?

COL. BACON: Are you talking about Ali Mussa Daqduq?

Q No, no, Imad Mukhnia (ph).

COL. BACON: I'm not -- you know what, I'm not as familiar with him either, so I would refrain from answering.

Q (Off mike) -- Hezbollah --

COL. BACON: You could make a case with Ali Mussa Daqduq that he was part of the Qods Force hierarchy in that he was working in Iran and then traveling into Iraq. But he was Lebanese Hezbollah, so I just try to be as -- I try to characterize it as fully as I know how.

Q Understood. Thank you, sir.

MR. HOLT: All right. We're out of time here.

But Colonel, thank you very much for joining us here on the bloggers roundtable today. Hopefully we can speak again in the future, maybe here in another month or so and see how things are going for another rollup.

COL. BACON: You're welcome, and I appreciate being able to show what we're doing. And hopefully I've been helpful. MR. HOLT: Yes, sir. I think you have. Thank you very much.

Q Thank you, sir.

COL. BACON: You're welcome.

END.